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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
PARTNERSHIP - CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF THE ENTITY - PART-
NER'S PARTICIPATION NOT NECESSARY FOR CULPABLE INTENT. -
Defendant partnerships were charged, as entities, with criminal vio-
lations of regulations' promulgated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Partnerships are not specifically mentioned as sub-
ject to criminal prosecution for such violations 2 and the defen-
dant contended that the aggregate theory of partnerships would not
allow conviction of the entity without legislative authority. The
Court, in reversing a dismissal of the informations, held that a part-
nership could violate the statute in question without the knowledge
and participation of the partners as individuals, even with the statu-
tory provision for a knowing violation, 3 although such conviction
could not lead to punishment of the individual partners. United
States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
As a general rule, the doctrine of respondeat superior is opposed
to our traditional concepts of criminal law.4 Many exceptions ap-
pear in the criminal law, however, when no intent is necessary 5 and
the servant or agent is acting within the scope of his employment.
There are certain crimes to which vicarious liability has never
been applied,7 and which are intrinsically unfit for the doctrine.8
Where respondeat superior is applicable, however, a difficulty lies
in determining what prior conditions must be met.
118 U.S.C. § 835 (1952). Defendants were also charged with violations
of 71 Stat. 352 (1957), 49 U.S.C. §322(a) (Supp. V, 1958), amending
49 Stat. 564 (1935). See notes 3 and 15 infra.
218 U.S.C. §2 (1952).
3 18 U.S.C. § 835 (1952): "[W]hoever knowingly violates any such regu-
lation shall be fined . . . or imprisoned. . . ." 49 Stat. 564 (1935), 49 U.S.C.§ 322(a) (Supp. V, 1958): "Any person knowingly and willfully violating
any provision . . . shall . . . be fined .. "
4 See Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV.
L. REv. 689, 702 (1930).
-5United States v. Boynton, 297 Fed. 261 (E.D. Mich. 1924) (use of real
property in violation of the National Prohibition Act); Hershorn v. People,
108 Colo. 43, 113 P.2d 680 (1941) (illegal sale of intoxicating liquor); City
of Spokane v. Patterson, 46 Wash. 93, 89 Pac. 402 (1907) (blasting within
city limits); Bryan v. Adler, 97 Wis. 124, 72 N.W. 368 (1897) (violation
of civil rights law by a waiter). See generally Annots., 139 A.L.R. 306
(1942), 121 A.L.R. 642 (1939).
6 See CRANE, PARTNERSHIP AND OTHER UNINcoRPoRATEi> AssoCIATIoNs
§ 54(g) (2d ed. 1952).
7 "[T]here are certain crimes of which a corporation cannot be guilty;
as, for instance, bigamy, perjury, rape, murder, and other offenses, which will
readily suggest themselves to the mind. United States v. John Kelso Co., 86
Fed. 304, 306 (N.D. Cal. 1898). It is rarely pointed out, but should be
realized, that a partnership is as 'incapable' of committing the same crimes;
that is, the offenses are not of a type, the consequences of which are usually
attributable to associated groups." STEVENS, PRIVATE CoRoRAnloNs 366 n.24
(2d ed. 1949).
8 See CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES § 101 (5th ed. 1952).
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The main distinction between the federal and New York posi-
tions on vicarious criminal liability is the degree of authority neces-
sary in the agent. In a leading New York case,9 the corporate de-
fendant was charged with larceny because of a practice of reselling
fur coats which had already been purchased and on *hich deposits
had been accepted. The Court of Appeals recognized that a cor-
poration could commit this crime but reversed the conviction because
of a lack of proof in the record that a corporate officer had partici-
pated or acquiesced in the resale. In prosecutions for crimes such
as larceny, of which intent is a necessary element, New York re-
quires that the intent be found or acquiesced in by an officer of the
defendant corporation.
Federal courts have not generally so restricted the persons in
whom the guilty intent may be found. Agents and officers may
transmit criminal guilt as well as civil liability.10 In a decision of
the United States Supreme Court it was established that, if acting
within the scope of their agency, agents may cause their corporate
principals to be criminally liable." In St. Johnsbury Trucking Co.
v. United States,12 which dealt with this problem as well as with the
statute for violation of which the defendant in the principal case was
prosecuted, Chief Judge Magruder stated that where Congress has
proscribed "knowing" violations, "it is usually held to be enough to
charge the corporation with guilt if any agent or servant of the cor-
poration, acting for the corporation in the scope of his employment,
has the guilty knowledge. . .. ,, '3 In federal courts, therefore, lack
of knowledge by the directors and officers, and care on their part
to see to it that violations do not occur, are not sufficient to absolve
a corporation from guilt, provided that the employees charged with
the duty of compliance with the regulations had knowledge of the
violation.
In the case of a malum prohibitum statute not requiring culpable
intent, New York seems to be more nearly in accord with the federal
view, the courts holding that mere benefit is sufficient to hold the
9 People v. Canadian Fur Trappers Corp., 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E. 455(1928).
10 "No distinctions are made in these cases between officers and agents, or
between persons holding positions involving varying degrees of responsibility."
United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1946)
(violation of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 by a salesman).
"[I]t is too late in the day to say that such offense, within the scope of the
employee's authority, cannot be brought home to the corporation." United
States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342, 343 (3d Cir. 1947) (Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942 violated in spite of express instructions to contrary by
defendant).II New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-95 (1909).
12 220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955).
13 Id. at 398.
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principal liable, without proof of knowledge in the officers or
directors. 14
A closely related problem in this area of vicarious criminal lia-
bility is the vulnerability of the agent for the crimes of his principal.
It should be observed that conviction of the business organization
will not necessarily lead to an unjust imprisonment of its officers or
partners. The statute involved in the principal case, which provides
for imprisonment in addition to a fine, has been interpreted as re-
quiring culpable intent.15 Conviction of the partnership itself re-
sults therefore only in the fine. "[T] he natural inference, when a
statute prescribes two independent penalties, is that it means to in-
flict them so far as it can, and that if one of them is impossible, it
does not mean on that account to let the defendant escape." 16 But
criminal liability is personal and, even when a partner commits the
act, those partners who do not participate are not subject to imprison-
ment for crimes in which guilty intent is an element. 17
The factor of culpable intent is well established as a necessary
element in any violation of the relevant section of the regulations of
the Interstate Commerce Commission I and it should not be presumed
that in the instant case the Supreme Court has, by implication, made
141 In People v. Raphael, 190 Misc. 582, 72 N.Y.S.2d 748 (War Emergency Ct.[Magis. Ct.] 1947), defendant corporation was acquitted of violation of rent
control regulations while its superintendent was convicted for taking and keeping
an illegal bonus. The court held that for corporate liability for the crime of
any agent or employee it must be shown that, 1) the corporation has bene-
fited from the crime or, 2) officers participated or, 3) officers authorized the
act or, 4) the corporation had knowledge of the crime or, 5) it was chargeable
with negligence in not having such knowledge. Id. at 584, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
15 18 U.S.C. § 835 (1952) was subject to the Supreme Court's consideration
in Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952), and
was interpreted as requiring culpable intent as a necessary element of the
offense. At this time it should also be noted that 49 Stat. 564 (1935), 49 U.S.C.§ 322(a) (Supp. V, 1958), while forbidding "knowing and willful" violations,
was interpreted in United States v. Gunn, 97 F. Supp. 476 (W.D. Ark. 1950)
as a statute which ". . . does not require proof of such specific intent on the
part of a defendant charged with an offense under the statute. These words
are words of many meanings, depending upon the context in which they are
used. In statutes denouncing offenses involving turpitude the use of such
words usually implies an evil purpose or criminal intent but when referring to
acts not in themselves wrong, the words do not usually carry any such impli-
cation." Id. at 480.6 United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 55 (1909).17 See Levin v. United States, 5 F.2d 598, 603 (9th Cir. 1925); CRANE,
PARTNERSHIP AND OTHER UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS § 54(g) (2d ed.
1952).
1I Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra note 15; United States
v. Chicago Express, Inc., 235 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1956). "By using the word
'knowingly' in § 835, we think Congress .. . removed violations from the
classification familiarly known as offenses malum prohibitum, public welfare,
and civil offenses." Id. at 786. St. Johnsbury Trucking v. United States, 220
F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955); United States v. Deer, 131 F. Supp. 319 (E.D.
Wash. 1955).
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the section merely malum prohibitum. The decision that a partner-
ship, without the knowledge or participation of the partners, can vio-
late this section must be taken as an application to partnerships of the
principles previously applied in the federal courts to corporations,
i.e., that agents or employees as well as officers can cause an imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions.' 9 As the government appeal was only
from a dismissal of the informations, the Court does not indicate what
degree of authority or responsibility an employee must have in order
to criminally bind the partnership.
At this point a distinction should be made between the corporate
and partnership theories. The corporation is an artificial person
capable of activity only through agents. The partnership is a group
of individuals each of whom ordinarily participates in the conduct of
the business as a co-owner. To hold a partnership liable for a crime
requiring intent, it would appear that the intent must be found in one
capable of knowing or willing for the partnership, i.e., a partner. It
could possibly be argued that a managing agent or dispatcher in a
partnership's trucking business is a person of such stature that his
knowledge or intent could be attributed to the partnership. Such
reasoning would be closely akin to that upon which the corporation
is held responsible for the acts of an officer not a member of the board
of directors.
However, the Court in the principal case does not indicate that
criminal liability for knowing or willful crimes will be imposed only
when a partner or responsible employee has the necessary intent.
Rather, it seems to rest its conclusion on the fact that the criminal
fine is levied only against firm assets, not the individual assets of the
partners. 20  Yet the fact remains that if the necessary intent was
not present in the party charged with the crime, no crime was com-
mitted and neither fine nor imprisonment may be imposed.
There are different reasons for the imposition of vicarious lia-
bility for torts and for crimes.2 ' In tort the purpose of respondeat
superior is to place the burden of risk on the business owners and thus
distribute the losses over a wider area. As to those criminal acts to
which the doctrine applies, the main concern is to prevent a reoccur-
rence of the offense. With this in mind, the Court's decision to adopt
the popular concept of the partnership as an entity responsible for
the acts of its agents seems proper. But as long as guilty intent is
an element in violations of section 835, partners should not be held
liable for offenses committed by employees in whom they did not
vest authority.
19 See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
20 "The corollary is, of course, that the conviction of a partnership cannot
be used to punish the individual partners, who might be completely free of
personal guilt. As in the case of corporations, the conviction of the entity can
lead only to a fine levied on the firm's assets." United States v. A & P
Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 127 (1958).
21 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 114 (rev. ed. 1946).
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